That was not the plan. The European Union was not designed and created to become a geopolitical power. The intention, expressed explicitly or not, was that, after two world wars started in Europe, such an explosive context should never be possible again. And in order for this objective to be achieved, it was no accident that the foundation of the EU was laid precisely by France and Germany, the great European powers that have had such a turbulent relationship throughout history. Later, new states joined this nucleus animated by the values that this economic and political union promotes: democratic norms, the rule of law, free movement of capital and labor.
The objective was achieved. Peace on the continent was preserved for 80 years, economic development accelerated for the benefit of both newcomers and old members, and democratic standards were consolidated in countries lacking this tradition.
The fact that the EU was an instrument meant to solve the historical problems of Europe made the Union an organization primarily oriented towards the interior of the continent. The EU never had great geopolitical ambitions, and when they were mentioned, they rather derived from the economic interests of the community block, increasingly dependent on foreign markets for relocations or the export of products and services.
The EU never had the ambitions of a world power at a time when the chessboard was already occupied by two superpowers, the USSR and the USA, the latter being its great protector through the creation of NATO. And as the great protector and financial contributor to NATO, the USA ensured the leadership of this multi-state organization that ended up maintaining the geopolitical stability of post-war Europe, ultimately surviving the Warsaw Pact and the USSR.
But once these disappeared and the feeling of external threats faded, Europe let its guard down. The illusion of eternal peace through economic interdependence stepped in. A uni-polar world dominated by the USA and globalization offered an encouraging context for Europe to be concerned only with return on equity and not at all with defense budgets or the development of the related industry.
And such a benign context offered another advantage (or illusion?): even if the decision-making process of the EU was complicated and bureaucratic, after a while, a final decision was reached by consensus. There was nothing terribly urgent, nothing of existential importance. And such a cumbersome decision mechanism, having the disadvantages of any compromise made to reach consensus, made the geopolitical ambitions of the EU, as many as they were, to be viewed with condescension by the great world and regional powers, whether partners (USA) or competitors (Russia , China). The EU had no chance to compete with them for real as a geopolitical power.
We are no longer in that historical context. The geopolitical situation has changed dramatically, and in a multipolar world like today’s, the EU can no longer rely on the exclusive protectorate of the USA for at least two reasons. The first relates to the tendency of the American electorate and political class to prioritize an internal agenda. Regarding the foreign agenda, the priorities changed as well, whereby the point of interest moved from Europe to Asia and, more precisely, to the geopolitical competition that China, as an emerging power, brings.
The second reason is related to the inability of the US to face, simultaneously, potential military conflicts with regional or aspiring powers such as China, Russia, Iran or North Korea. As I mentioned in the comment “The common denominator of the current poly-crisis“, this relative “weakness” of the USA is noted in an article entitled “The overstretched superpower”, published in January 2022 by Professor Hal Brands in Foreign Affairs magazine. In the article, the author emphasized that it would be impossible for the United States to continue to have a defense strategy deeply out of balance with the foreign policy they support.
In the context of the cold war, the US had a defense strategy that assumed the ability to fight two major regional wars: the Soviet Union and a second state. Today, following successive adjustments to the doctrine, the US only aims to win a conflict.
In fact, President Putin’s logic started from this continuous weakening of the USA’s ability to project a credible force in all the areas of the world where it had commitments. His belief was that by focusing primarily on China, the US would be willing to accept the withdrawal of the areas of influence that Russia achieves by force of arms.
In such a context, the EU has no other choice but to rethink its geostrategic ambitions perspective by becoming a regional military power. But the big problem is that the EU was not designed for such a thing.
European leaders were very motivated to provide declarative or participatory support of the demonstrations in Kiev in 2004, which led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian leadership, but terribly passive when the annexation of Crimea by Russia required a harsh reaction. Later, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia was the final test showing how inadequate the decision-making mechanism of the EU is in times of crisis when there is no more time for traditional prolonged debates.
Today, the EU’s military ambitions are brought to another level. There is a lot of talk about the relaunch of the European defense industry, about a preemptive foreign and defense policy that would keep Russia at bay through strong military support for Ukraine and, finally, about an European defense alliance in response to a potential US withdrawal from Europe. Unfortunately, with the current decision-making mechanism, these are only illusions as long as any state will have a right of veto on topics related to foreign policy (such as sanctions), the allocation of resources (for supporting Ukraine, for example) or of the issuance of joint bonds for the financing of military acquisitions.
The problem brought by the consensus based decision-making is the elephant in the EU room that is talked about too little or, when it is done, small countries are the first to defend it. Small countries that, more than once, have abused their right of veto for domestic political reasons, at the expense of really important stakes for the European community. The idea of the right to veto is also popular among the former communist countries, which still bear the traces of the period when they were only executors of the decisions made in Moscow.
However, the explanation is deeper than that. In fact, the reason why every European leader wants to have a steering wheel is related to the lack of trust between those who don’t miss a day to take a picture together shaking hands in Brussels. The suspicion is that, once a majority voting system would be accepted, it would benefit the big countries of Europe, and that they would take advantage of it to the detriment of the smaller countries. Without solving these suspicions, without cultivating a climate of trust, no one will want to reduce the number of steering wheels, the risk of decisional blockage being major, with much more serious consequences, perhaps even existential for some of the Europeans.
Subjects such as reducing the fragmentation of military production or the creation of a European nuclear umbrella will not be able to be addressed and completed without the conviction that the tanks produced by Europe in Germany will permanently benefit all Europeans and not just the German industry. Or that France’s nuclear arsenal will be used as a deterrent not only in the event of an attack on France or its neighbors, but also in the event of an attack on the countries on the eastern border of the EU.
I am not so naive as to imagine that such a subject is easy to approach. But continuing the expansion of the EU will only complicate the decision-making process until it is completely blocked. For this reason, the evaluation and rethinking of the decision-making system of the EU is imperative, and it can only be the result of some compromises. As one may wish for a majority system to avoid, for example, Hungary’s blocking of aid to Ukraine, or Austria’s blocking of the Schengen extension. But are the countries on the eastern border ready to accept a majority decision on defense matters, supported by countries located thousands of kilometers away from a potential aggressor? Especially since some of them distinguished themselves over time by their conciliatory foreign policy in relation to Russia.
The blockage caused by such dilemmas is not auspicious and requires a discussion as serious and applied as possible. This is because, in the event of a major geopolitical crisis, the decision-making mechanism of the EU is totally inadequate, which represents a major vulnerability for the entire community.
Unfortunately, the political developments in Europe mean that solving this critical dysfunction has little chance of success in the short term. The rise of nationalist parties will only make the decision-making process even more difficult, pitting the national interest against the community interest. Not by chance, the European political fragmentation is supported by the hostile countries, knowing that it is the essential ingredient of blocking the decision-making process of the EU and, in the last instance, of the weakness of the EU.
But the bad news does not stop here. Assuming that in 6 months the EU would no longer have 27 steering wheels, but only 2 or 3, who would be the ones to take control and who would be accepted by the rest of the travelers? It is not at all clear. Because Europe is in a deep crisis of continental leaders. The traditional core of European leadership, France and Germany, is almost non-existent due to internal political developments, which make mainstream political leaders defensive against the rise of parties from the extremes of the political spectrum. And this is weakening both their standing and credibility in the EU.
The recent celebration of finally reaching a political configuration for the EU’s governing structures does not deserve much enthusiasm. Because the real stake for the EU is not the filling of some positions in an organizational chart, but the speed and quality of the decisions that such a decision structure will be able to make. And here, unfortunately, the risk is that, at best, we make no progress. Which is totally insufficient and risky.
