This is the first thought that comes to mind as I watch the weird behavior of leaders from the West to the East of Europe every time the two-speed Europe project is addressed.

Let us look first at the Visegrad Four, Romania and Bulgaria. They all profess to be against a two-speed Europe as that would sideline them and have them risk by losing the clout a fully-fledged member has.

And yet, by their rhetoric and actions, they carry on cutting themselves off from the rest of the Member States. Poland has refused to renew Donald Tusk`s mandate, President of the EU Council, the institution which brings together all EU Member States leaders. That is a position where the negotiating and mediation skills and trustworthiness, that is the person itself, carry more weight than the country that person comes from. A mandate renewal, agreed by all the EU countries did not matter for the Polish leaders more concerned about getting revenge on their co-national with different political views. And just to make sure that they win the Congeniality award, the Poles blocked the adoption of the final Brussels Summit Declaration.

Romania is nothing less and makes a good case for the need of a two-speed Europe. We have been singled out as the country with the highest public deficit growth in Europe and were asked to come up with a plausible plan to keep the deficit below 3%. More bluntly put, current plans are wishful thinking. Add to that all the rule of law debates which, sadly, position us in a league of our own.

On the other hand, the Bulgarian president announced these days that “I do not, nor will I ever agree to the EU-Canada free trade agreement”. The fact that the treaty stands for tough negotiations over many years and last minute trade-offs made by both sides does not stop him from saying that once it is approved by Parliament he will challenge it to the Constitutional Court.

To say nothing of Hungary…

Sadly, such attitudes will only have Central and Eastern Europe stand out as a region that works under other parameters than most Europe and presents an immediate justification for a two-speed Europe. Let those wanting to stand aside, do so.

Beyond, however, the justification voluntarily provided by the region, does a two-speed Europe make sense? It all hinges on where you stand … Looking from the East, it is clearly identified with marginalization and a fear of halting the convergence efforts. Romania`s case for joining the hard core countries? Realistically speaking, I think it caused a few smiles in the European governments. What qualifies it for that position? The 10-year growth gap, never recovered compared to a country such as Poland and even Poland is about to miss the boat?

On the other hand, looking from the West, namely from the Western politicians` standpoint, the project is paramount. It is meant to release the EU states from the obligation to align along the lowest common denominator given by states with low integration ambitions and a high concern to maintain their sovereignty as untouched as possible. According to their vision, the project should allow free rein to countries wishing for a deeper economic and political integration. I do believe, however, that western politicians are making a big mistake by putting forward a solution to a false problem.

The EU identity and integration issue has nothing to do with East European countries. It first hinges on the Europeans` appetite for deeper integration. As far as that goes, the number of skeptics is way higher in the EU`s developed states, spreading even among their common citizens. Let us recall that it was this skepticism that preceded the advent of nationalism across Central Europe and that it was fuelled in part by the European politicians` inability to build in all those decades a European identity that would prevail over the strong national identities still existing in Europe. Europeans` eagerness for deeper and deeper integration dampened over the years whereas politicians` short-sightedness remained. Their agenda did no longer coincide with the Europeans` agenda.

This is a failure that has remained unnoticed or underestimated, in the context of a prosperous Europe, but it did cause countries diverge more after the shock caused by the crisis. As of that moment, cultural and national differences became the main obstacle to suggested solutions. Solidarity, previously so effective, did no longer work when things turned sour. Under these circumstances, identifying the Eurozone with the alleged hard core of a two-speed Europe does not make any sense. The Eurozone continues to be unstable and will stay so as long as it does not include countries that share more economic and cultural similarities.

The lesson from the failure of building the eurozone on political criteria continues to be ignored and now we are again seeing the emerging European hard core set up mainly on political criteria. What else could we infer from Germany, France, Italy and Spain, coming together at Versailles supporting a two-speed Europe? They claim, obviously, to be in the first-tier group.

Neither Spain, nor Italy or even France seem willing to admit that their economies, culture and governance have little in common with that of Germany. Is it really possible for the spending largesse in southern Europe to co-exist with the German rigor and austerity? Can we really imagine a single tax policy across all these countries that includes tax revenue transfers from Germany to Italy with no stringent controls on how the latter will use the German taxpayers` money? Has the German way of life become suddenly so popular among southern countries behind our backs? Will Germany submit to the decisions taken by a hypothetical decision-making body in which the Mediterranean countries will have a big say after a good siesta? It all seems delusional.

That makes me think that the two-speed Europe idea:

a) falsely points to Eastern Europe as a scape goat for the historic EU failures, taking advantage of the questionable behavior of the former

b) maintains the illusion of an homogeneous Western block despite obvious divergence

c) fails to provide an actual solution to the Eurozone problems

d) ignores the Europeans` reluctance to carry on the integration process

e) seems an improvised way out which ignores the complexity of problems facing Europe.

For this reason a two-speed Europe, as understandable as it may be from the standpoint of a certain exasperation of the West by the East, cannot constitute a solution. A much economically fairer solution is also the most intricate: a three-speed EU and two single monetary unions, a “hard” euro and a “weak” euro for the first and second speed, respectively.

That implies, however, that Germany agrees to a currency much stronger than the euro bound to hit its exports. So suffering and illusion trading is set to carry on for some years now, raising a big question over EU`s future.

As far as Romania goes, the key to at least remaining on the more advanced economies radar has nothing to do with pleading with the European powerful, but more with getting down to work and  being predictable. Pure and simple.

Have a nice weekend!

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